RKNHardering Help

Named injection markers in /proc/self/maps

ID: HOOK_MARKERS Category: Hooks and process integrity Status in RKNHardering 2.10.0: Active check Role in the verdict: Medium

This page describes the actual implementation in RKNHardering 2.10.0. It distinguishes what can be done without root, what requires root, and where a mitigation only reduces one signal without hiding the VPN as a whole.

What is checked and why

The native function reads /proc/self/maps for the current process and searches for frida-agent, frida-gadget, libfrida, libsubstrate, com.saurik.substrate, XposedBridge, libxposed, lspatch, LSPosed, libriru, and libzygisk. For a match, it records the marker and the complete map line. Kotlin treats known markers as high confidence, but sets needsReview rather than marking the category directly as detected.

Exact trigger condition

Any maps line containing one of the fixed markers creates a review finding; known markers receive high confidence.

What the result means

The check shows that a library or mapping with a recognizable name is loaded into the process. This is strong evidence of instrumentation, but not necessarily malicious instrumentation; a test build, accessibility or monitoring SDK, or a user-installed module may also be responsible.

How the line affects the report: The line does not produce a final verdict on its own, but it sets needsReview=true and adds medium-confidence evidence.

Limitations and possible false positives

Renaming a file bypasses the string list but not other integrity checks. Anonymous or memfd mappings may have no marker. Conversely, a harmless path containing one of these words could theoretically match.

This line must be evaluated together with neighboring signals. A clean result from a single API does not simultaneously cover Java Binder, libc, raw netlink/syscalls, procfs/sysfs, local sockets, and server-side indicators.

Recommendations for this vector

Without root

Without root, the best option is a clean APK from a trusted source, with no repacking, LSPatch, Frida Gadget, virtualization, or rootless Xposed. Moving the app into a “second space” does not automatically clean its process: the container may inject its own libraries and leave even more discrepancies.

With root

On a rooted device, do not include the target app in the Xposed/Vector scope or load a Zygisk module into it unless necessary. For VPN hiding, prefer a design in which Java filtering runs in system_server and native filtering runs in the kernel. DenyList/App Profile, NoHello, Zygisk Next, SUSFS, and similar tools may reduce some traces, but none guarantees protection against maps, linker, mount, and raw-syscall checks at the same time.

How to verify the result

For your own debuggable build, you can capture maps with run-as:

adb shell run-as com.notcvnt.rknhardering cat /proc/self/maps 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei 'frida|xposed|lsposed|zygisk|riru|substrate|lspatch'

For a release build, run-as is normally unavailable. Use the check’s own detail and compare it with the list of loaded modules.

After any change, force-stop both RKNHardering and the VPN client, start them again, and repeat the full scan. Zygisk, Xposed, and kernel modules usually require a reboot. Compare not only this line but also neighboring signals: a partial hook often creates inconsistencies between APIs.

Required permissions and risks

The probe itself runs with ordinary app permissions and does not request root. The ADB commands below are for orientation only: adb shell runs under a different UID and may see either more or less than the app process. The decisive test is to run the check again after a force-stop.

Risks

/proc/self/maps output contains paths and process-layout information; do not publish it in full without redaction. Disabling modules may affect other applications.

Rollback

Revert the most recent change: disable the added module or rule through its normal manager, reboot the device, and repeat the baseline scan. Do not layer another hook on top of an unknown state.

Evidence level

Medium. Verified against the fixed kSuspiciousMarkers array and evaluateHookMarkers().

The status of a third-party solution does not automatically carry over to this device. A module developer’s claim is only the initial hypothesis; confirmation requires a reproducible RKNHardering result on the specific Android version, firmware, and kernel.

Sources and last verification date

Related signals: rwx-memory-regions, library-integrity, lsposed, hook-property.

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