RKNHardering Help

Legacy Nonstandard IPv4 Routes on a VPN Interface

ID: VPN_POLICY_RULES Category: Routes and network stack Status in RKNHardering 2.10.0: Active check Role in the verdict: High

This page describes the actual implementation in RKNHardering 2.10.0. It distinguishes what can be done without root, what requires root, and where a mitigation only reduces one signal without hiding the VPN as a whole.

What is checked and why

While reading /proc/net/route, every row on a fixed VPN interface whose destination is neither 0 nor FFFFFFFF emits vpn_policy_rules|iface=... dest=<hex>. The legacy kind is high confidence.

Exact trigger condition

A nondefault, non-FFFFFFFF IPv4 route through tun0, tun1, utun0, ppp0, wg0, or wg1.

What the result means

The signal reflects split or policy routes through a tunnel, but its historical name is broader than the implementation: these are ordinary route rows, not ip rule entries.

How the line affects the report: The line sets detected=true and is treated as a high-confidence local indicator.

Limitations and possible false positives

Only IPv4 procfs and fixed names are covered. Actual netlink policy rules are checked separately.

This line must be evaluated together with neighboring signals. A clean result from a single API does not simultaneously cover Java Binder, libc, raw netlink/syscalls, procfs/sysfs, local sockets, and server-side indicators.

Recommendations for this vector

Without root

Without root, address the routing design rather than the way the table is displayed. Use an external gateway for a clean phone. If the VPN remains in VpnService, configure split routing so that the app under test actually exits through the expected physical network, but do not treat this as hiding local routes: the interface and policy rules may remain visible. Do not delete routes with ip route on a live device—Android and the VPN service will recreate them, and connectivity may be interrupted.

With root

On a rooted device, the backend must filter the data source rather than libc alone. In upstream VPNHide, the kernel backends are intended for ioctl, netlink, and some route/procfs vectors; Zygisk remains a conditional fallback. Do not install kmod and KPM together, because they may intercept the same kernel functions. VPNHide Next claims broader PMTU/MSS/qdisc/BPF coverage, but this is an external claim that must be reproduced on the specific kernel.

How to verify the result

adb shell cat /proc/net/route 2>&1
adb shell ip -4 route show table all

The destination in procfs is represented as little-endian hexadecimal.

After any change, force-stop both RKNHardering and the VPN client, start them again, and repeat the full scan. Zygisk, Xposed, and kernel modules usually require a reboot. Compare not only this line but also neighboring signals: a partial hook often creates inconsistencies between APIs.

Required permissions and risks

The probe itself runs with ordinary app permissions and does not request root. The ADB commands below are for orientation only: adb shell runs under a different UID and may see either more or less than the app process. The decisive test is to run the check again after a force-stop.

Risks

Deleting split routes may send private-network traffic to the wrong path or cut off access entirely.

Rollback

Revert the most recent change: disable the added module or rule through its normal manager, reboot the device, and repeat the baseline scan. Do not layer another hook on top of an unknown state.

Evidence level

High. Verified from the destination conditions and fixed VPN names; legacy high confidence.

The status of a third-party solution does not automatically carry over to this device. A module developer’s claim is only the initial hypothesis; confirmation requires a reproducible RKNHardering result on the specific Android version, firmware, and kernel.

Sources and last verification date

Related signals: vpn-policy-rules-netlink, route-vpn-interface, route-table.

Back to the Native signs reference